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The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol is being included in a
growing number of connected objects such as smartphones, fit-
ness trackers, headphones and smartwatches. As part of the service
discovery mechanism of BLE, devices announce themselves by
broadcasting radio signals called advertisement packets that can be
collected with off-the-shelf hardware and software. To avoid the
risk of tracking based on those messages, BLE features an address
randomization mechanism that substitutes the device MAC address
with random temporary pseudonyms. However, the payload of the
advertisement packet still contains fields that can hamper the ran-
domization mechanism by exposing counters and static identifiers.
In addition to defeating the randomization mechanism, some of
these fields can leak sensitive attributes of the owner such as his
medical condition.
As a consequence, we implemented Himiko to raise awareness
about the privacy issues that the BLE advertising mechanism can
involve. This tool aims to show the information that a passive eaves-
dropper can infer by leveraging the contents of BLE advertisement
packets. The advertising raw data are collected and processed from
devices that have their Bluetooth interface enabled. The user is
then shown the information that are leaking from his device.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has been adopted for devices with low
energy resources such as smartphones, fitness trackers, headphones
and smartwatches. According to the Bluetooth Special Interest
Group (SIG), more than 2 billion devices supporting BLE have been
shipped in 2017 [1].
While wireless technologies such as Bluetooth/BLE or Wi-Fi




















Figure 1: Architecture of the system.
users to privacy threats. For instance, users can be subject to physi-
cal tracking because of the identifiers found within the radio sig-
nals emitted by their devices [4, 7, 8]. To protect users against this
threat, the Bluetooth Core Specification [6, Vol 3, Part C, sec. 10.7]
defines the use of temporary link layer identifiers that periodically
change for a random value. Despite this improvement, it has been
shown [3, 4] that some information can still leak from BLE devices.
As other wireless technologies, BLE embeds an advertising mech-
anism [6, Vol 3, Part C, sec. 11] that provides a means to discover
nearby devices along with their characteristics and available ser-
vices. To enable this discovery mechanism, BLE devices periodically
broadcast advertisement packets that are populated with a variety
of cleartext information.
In addition to tracking [5], advertisement packets include data
that can reveal the type of the device [2], exposing the user to
inventory attacks and inference of sensitive attributes. For instance,
some medical devices are broadcasting their types (hearing aid,
insulin pen, etc.) trivially betraying a medical condition of the
owner.
The Himiko tool extends those works by capturing and process-
ing in real-time the content of advertisement packets. Based on
online official Bluetooth SIG resources1 along with recent research
findings [2], we implemented a python parser that can decode both
structured (specified) and manufacturer specific (non-specified) ad-
vertising data. We also provide a user-friendly interface to display
the extracted information. Finally, the goal of Himiko is to raise
users’ awareness of privacy issues that the advertising mechanism
of BLE devices can imply.
2 THE HIMIKO TOOL
The Himiko tool is based on a three-step process. First, advertise-
ment packets emitted by a BLE device are captured through a Blue-
tooth interface. Then, the raw data are parsed and processed to
extract information that can both defeat the randomization mech-
anism and be used to infer attributes of the owner. Finally, the
1https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/assigned-numbers
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results of the processing are displayed as a feedback to the user.
The architecture of the tool is presented in Figure 1.
To capture the advertisement packets, our tool only requires
two Bluetooth cards supporting the BLE protocol. This is the case
for most basic off-the-shelf Bluetooth cards on modern computers
running a Unix-like system. Nearby devices are detected using
the Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) and using external
dongles such as a CSR v4.0 Bluetooth USB dongle2 can simplify the
estimation of proximity of users’ devices.
The tool is composed of three main files. The first one, orches-
trator.sh, is a bash script configuring the Bluetooth interfaces to
enter in the BLE scanning mode featured by the bluepy3 python
library. The latter outputs the captured advertising raw data in
a string stream, which can then be parsed and processed in real-
time by the second python script, demo.py. This script is composed
of three python modules – parserModule, profilerModule and
searchingModule – that respectively parse the advertising raw
data, fetch the internal BLE services database of the device and
search for this device on Google Shopping or Qwant marketplaces.
Finally, hmi.html embeds web technologies (css, javascript and
php) that structure and beautify the results of the analysis before
to be displayed in a Mozilla Firefox web browser.
The knowledge base used by the parserModule to decode adver-
tisement packets has been built from the online official Bluetooth
SIG resources, third-party public resources such as the advlib4 ad-
vertisement packet decoding library, the RaMBLE5 Android mobile
application and the bleah6 BLE scanner tool, but also from the
reverse engineering of the Apple Handoff, Microsoft Connected
Devices Platform and Google Nearby proximity protocols [2].
The only information captured by our tool are data contained
in advertisement packets sent by BLE devices having an enabled
Bluetooth interface. Traffic data sent by associated devices, tim-
ing or physical-layer information are not considered. The display
includes the metadata of the advertisement packet (device addr.,
type of addr., etc.), a list of the extracted information, an inference
of the device type based on its advertised device name along with
a dump of the internal BLE services database of the device. Note
that, such a database is readable by default as the Bluetooth Core
Specification [6, Vol 3, Part G, sec. 8.1] does not consider included
information as private or confidential. Finally, when a BLE device
broadcasts its device name, the owner of the involved device can
decide to provide additional information7 on the device in order to
improve the device identification capabilities of Himiko.
To minimize privacy risks for the users of our tool, we apply
the minimization principle and keep as little necessary information
as possible. In particular, all collected data are kept in memory
during the processing time before being immediately erased when
the results are displayed to the users. Furthermore, the tool only
detects devices in close range of the antenna (a few centimeters)







7Assisted by the operator, the owner can provide a regular expression matching the
device name along with information such as the vendor, model and type.
3 INTERACTIONWITH PARTICIPANTS
During the demonstration, participants will be able to interact
with Himiko by testing the information broadcasted by their BLE
enabled devices. By bringing their device close to the Bluetooth
antennas ofHimiko, theywill trigger a capture event that will record
an advertisement packet emitted by their device. Such a packet
contains raw data that will be parsed then processed by the tool
to compute a comprehensive analysis of the emitted information
of the device. The results of this process will be displayed as a
feedback to the user on a screen. Figure 2 presents an example of
the output triggered by a Chipolo Classic8 BLE keyring device. In
addition, when a device advertises its device name, participants
will have the opportunity to contribute to the knowledge base of
Himiko by providing additional information on their device.
4 CONCLUSION
We introduced Himiko, a user-friendly tool to shed light on the
privacy issues of BLE enabled devices. The objective of this tool is
to raise awareness on the necessity to complement the Bluetooth
Core Specification with additional requirements that would cover
privacy issues on the BLE protocol, and especially on the advertising
mechanism. In fact, the specifications do not provide any guidelines
about the content of the advertising payload regarding the privacy
implications. In addition, we aim to raise public awareness with
regard to the information that can be exposed by their BLE enabled
devices.
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Figure 2: Example output of a Chipolo Classic BLE keyring device.
